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The rapid proliferation of communications and computer
networks has spawned an urgent need for comparable
developments in network security. Significant issues such as
message authenticity, transmissions confidentiality and data
integrity must be addressed. Unfortunately, extremely few
network designs effectively deal with such complex security
issues, especially those for multilevel network environments.
To encourage greater advancement in this important field,
standards are needed to effectively address several aspects
of network security. Specifically, standard security
protocols are needed to influence the direction of industry
in providing multilevel secure network designs.
In this thesis, we propose three important principles
that will enhance standard security protocol designs. These
include the Compatibility Principle, the Inclusion Principle
and the Support Principle. We describe the concepts of these
design principles and demonstrate their benefits for security
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. NETWORK SECURITY OVERVIEW
The continual accessions of new applications and designs
for computer and communications networks are accompanied by
an ever increasing need for sufficient network security.
However, current developments in network security lag far
behind other aspects of distributed computing technology.
The terms "network security" refer to protection against any
unauthorized modification, disclosure or destruction of
network information, or loss of network service leading to
the nonavailability of critical information.
The security issues that are raised regarding computer
networks are frequently more complex than those surrounding a
single-processor system. The increase in complexity
primarily stems from the distributed nature of the network.
A network may be comprised of any number of component
computers which are linked by a communications medium for the
purpose of transferring information. For example, a network
may consist of multiple hosts with several, possibly
dissimilar operating systems which are connected by
inherently non-secure paths. Such a configuration leads to
serious concerns regarding network security including data
integrity, authenticity, denial of service, and data
confidentiality.
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Network data is vulnerable to active threats that lead to
unauthorized alterations of information. To preserve the
integrity of network data, countermeasures are employed to
defend against unauthorized modification of messages,
insertion of fraudulent messages, deletion, replay or
reordering of messages. The network must ensure that
information is accurately transmitted from source to
destination despite external attack or internal failure.
Since network communications may be subject to jamming and
active wiretap threats as well as line or node failures,
maintaining data integrity is no trivial endeavor.
Authenticity refers to the validity of a message or an
individual . The network must protect against fraudulent
transactions by verifying the correct identities of the
originator and the recipient, and by establishing the
validity of the message itself. Assuring the identity of a
user on a remote host may be a difficult task. Oftentimes, a
network host is unable to trust the authenticity of another
network host, let alone the authenticity of remote users.
Denial-of-service (DOS) is the nonavailablity of
communications to authorized users of the network. A DOS
condition exists if information throughput falls below some
predetermined minimum. DOS may result from component failure
or network overload as well as from unauthorized intervention
or sabatoge. The network must constantly monitor its
conditions and provide contingency measures that will enhance
the reliability, survivability and provide some continuity of
operations despite any casualty condition.
The confidentiality of network data is susceptible to
passive wiretapping attacks which result in unauthorized
disclosures of network information. By encrypting data
transmissions, the network can effectively prevent the
unauthorized release of message content and deter the
successful analysis of communications traffic. The use of
encryption raises important questions as to the granularity
and distribution of encrypting/decrypting keys.
The situation becomes even more precarious when the
network system must simultaneously process data at multiple
sensitivity levels. In a multilevel secure network, the
system must permit access to information of multiple
sensitivity levels, by users with different security
clearances and needs-to-know, and still prevent users from
obtaining access to information for which they lack
authorization. In addition to dealing with all the security
issues previously addressed, a multilevel secure network must
enforce separations between processes and data of different
sensitivity levels. To do so, the network must ensure data
is properly labeled and clearance checks are performed before
releasing any sensitive information.
B. A NEED FOR STANDARDS
The need for multilevel secure systems that can be
sufficiently trusted to securely and effectively process
sensitive information, is widespread in defense related
environs. However, only a few such systems have been proven
secure, and these were modeled as single- state machines
[Ref. 1, 2]. In the past, the DOD has responded to
requirements for multilevel secure systems on a case-by-case
basis. However, because of the need for connectivity and
interoperability between heterogeneous computing systems,
this approach has become increasingly inadequate and cost
prohibitive
.
To encourage widespread industrial development and
marketing of secure computing systems, the DOD published the
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), and
sponsored the National Computer Security Center's (NCSC)
work, referred to as the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI)
[Ref. 3, 4]. The TCSEC and the TNI provide technical
guidance for the evaluation of security in single processor
systems and computer networks, respectively. These documents
represent the culmination of DOD standards for secure
computing systems.
Also recognizing the need for network security standards,
the International Standards Organization (ISO) drafted a
Security Addendum to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
model [Ref. 5]. While this document defines a number of
security services, it stops short of specifying any standard
protocol designs.
There is an urgent need for additional DOD standards
dealing with several aspects of network security. More
specifically, standard security services must be agreed upon,
and standard security protocols must be developed in order to
influence industrial designs for secure computer networks.
C. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
In this thesis, we are concerned with certain principles
for the design of standard security protocols. We propose
three design principles which we consider essential in
specifying standard security protocols for multilevel secure
network communications. These principles include (1) the
Compatibility Principle, (2) the Inclusion Principle, and (3)
the Support Principle.
The first of these, the Principle of Compatibility,
contends that security protocols must be designed to function
cooperatively within the existing network architecture. In
order to uphold network security requirements, these
protocols must be compatible with the structure of
conventional protocols.
The Principle of Inclusion represents a uniquely
effective approach to protecting data and processes of
multiple sensitivity levels. The Inclusion principle states
that higher-layer protocols designed to protect at a certain
sensitivity level, must properly include lower-layer
protocols which protect at the same sensitivity level.
The Support Principle is concerned with the
implementation alternatives for security protocols. It
suggests how security protocols may be realized within the
hardware and software of the network.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In this thesis, our purpose is to further the development
effort toward standard security protocols for multilevel
secure networks. Currently, standards address only the
evaluation process for network security. These standards are
reflected in the TCSEC and TNI
.
In Chapter II, TCSEC and TNI are discussed in some
detail. Here, we gain an appreciation for the intricate
requirements for computer and network security.
Additionally, we further our understanding of the types of
services that security protocols must provide.
In Chapter III, we develop the Principle of
Compatibility. We present the layered architecture of
conventional protocols and suggest an appropriate framework
for security protocols.
Chapter IV is devoted to the Inclusion Principle. We
introduce the properties of Inclusion and note their
implications for security protocol designs. Implementation
requirements are fully justified.
Chapter V is dedicated to the Support Principle.
Hardware and software protection mechanisms are surveyed to
identify ways in which they can support network security.
Numerous examples of security mechanisms and their actual
implementations are presented.
In Chapter VI, we conclude by summarizing the
implications of these design principles for security
protocols of multilevel secure network communications.
II. CRITERIA FOR TRUSTED SYSTEMS
A. STANDARDS FOR COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY
Relatively few standards exist for use in defining computer
and network security. Among these, Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) is one of the most widely acclaimed
documents for security in computing. Published by the DOD in
1983 (and revised in 1985), TCSEC provides an authoritative
guideline for evaluating the security features of general-
purpose computer systems.
Although TCSEC was designed to be application-independent,
it was recognized early-on that security requirements, as
specified in the criteria, would have to be adapted or expanded
in order to apply them to networked- systems . After much
examination and discussion, the National Computer Security
Center (NCSC) drafted the Trusted Network Interpretation of the
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TNI). The TNI was
issued in 1987 as a direct interpretation for computer
networks, of the general requirements set forth in TCSEC.
Together, the TCSEC and the TNI served as the basis for this
thesis research. Understanding the concepts presented in these
two publications is of fundamental importance in the design of
secure network protocols. In this chapter, each document will
be separately reviewed and its most pertinent aspects will be
highlighted.
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B. TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA
The TCSEC was developed to serve three intended purposes
[Ref. 3: p. 2]:
- to provide guidance to manufacturers of commercial ADP
systems as to what security features to include in their
systems design in order to satisfy the trust requirements of
sensitive applications,
- to provide DOD components with a means of measuring the
degree of trust that can be placed in computer systems used to
process classified or other sensitive . information,
- to provide a basis for specifying security requirements in
acquisition specifications.
The criteria specifies a "secure" computing system as one
that will control access to information, such that only
properly authorized individuals, or processes operating on
their behalf, will have access to read, write, create or delete
information. From this basic definition, six fundamental
computer security requirements are derived. The first four of
these requirements discuss what needs to be provided to control
access to information; the last two requirements address how to
obtain credible assurance that access control is satisfactorily
provided by a trusted computer system. A brief overview of
each requirement follows [Ref. 3:pp. 3-4, Ref. 6:pp. 282-283]:
- Security Policy. An explicit and well-defined security
policy must be enforced by the system.
- Marking. Each object must be associated with a "label"
that indicates its security level. The label must be available
for comparison each time access to the object is requested.
- Identification. Every subject must be uniquely and
assuredly identified. Such identification is necessary in
order to mediate each access request for information.
- Accountability. Audit information must be securely
maintained so that actions affecting security can be traced to
the responsible entity.
- Assurance. The computer system must contain hardware and
software mechanisms that can be independently evaluated to
provide sufficient assurance that the system enforces these
security requirements.
- Continuous Protection. The mechanisms that enforce these
security requirements must be protected against tampering
and/or unauthorized change.
There are four hierarchical divisions of criteria, D, C, B,
and A, where A represents the most comprehensive degree of
security. Additionally, divisions (excluding D) are subdivided
into hierarchical classes, CI, C2 , Bl, B2 , B3 , Al . Division C
and lower classes of division B are characterized by the
security mechanisms they possess and the assurance that can be
gained primarily through formal testing. Systems of the higher
classes in division B and division A derive their security
assurances through a more rigorous analysis of the design
process. [Ref. 3:pp. 5]
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The following is a brief abstract of each criteria class
[Ref. 3:pp. 93-94, Ref. 7:p. 101]:
- Class D: Minimal protection. This class consists of those
systems that have been evaluated but that fail to meet the
requirements for a higher class.
- Class CI: Discretionary Security protection. The Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) satisfies discretionary security
requirements through the separation of users and data. The CI
environment is expected to be one of cooperating users
processing data at the same level of sensitivity. (The TCB
consists of all the security-relevant portions of a system.
)
- Class C2 : Controlled Access protection. Systems enforce a
more finely grained discretionary access control. Users are
held individually accountable through login procedures,
security- related auditing and resource isolation.
- Class Bl: Labeled Security protection. All C2 features
are required. Additionally, an informal statement of the
security policy, data labeling and mandatory access control are
needed. All exported information must be correctly labeled,
and any flaws identified through testing must be removed.
- Class B2 : Structured protection. The TCB is based on a
formal security policy model which incorporates discretionary
and mandatory access control. The TCB must be structured into
protection-critical and non-protection-critical elements that
enable it to be more thoroughly tested. Authentication
mechanisms and stronger configuration management controls are
11
imposed. These systems are considered "relatively resistant"
to penetration.
- Class B3 : Security Domains. The TCB must satisfy the
requirements of a reference monitor. It must be tamper-
resistant and small enough to be analyzed and tested. Audit
mechanisms are expanded, recovery procedures are required, and
a security administrator is supported. These systems are
considered "highly resistant" to penetration.
- Class Al : Verified Design. These systems are functionally
equivalent to those in Class B3 . However, these systems
require a formal model of the security policy and a formal top-
level specification of the design. Formal verification
techniques result in a high degree of assurance that the TCB is
correctly implemented.
The TCSEC sets forth evaluation criteria for general-
purpose computer systems. However, the criteria fails to
address a number of issues peculiar to network security, such
as protection against data compromise and denial of service,
and integrity of transmitted data. After much debate, TNI was
drafted to address these outstanding issues and to provide more
specialized guidance for trusted computer networks.
C. TRUSTED NETWORK INTERPRETATION OF THE TCSEC
The TNI was written to serve the same functions for
networked systems that TCSEC performs for general purpose
computers. Essentially, it extends the evaluation classes and
12
criteria to trusted network systems and components. The
document is divided into two parts. Part I provides
interpretations of TCSEC security features and assurance
requirements. Its evaluation system is identical to that for
TCSEC [Ref . 8: p. 3]
.
Part II describes additional security services (eg.
,
communications integrity, denial of service, transmission
security) that are of significant concern in the network
environment [Ref. 4:p. IX].
The TNI provides two alternative network views for
accreditation and evaluation purposes: (1) as a single unified
system referred to as a "single trusted system", or (2) as a
collection of two or more interconnected, independently-
accredited Automated Information Systems (AISs)
[Ref. 4:p. XIII]
.
From this first perspective, a network is regarded as an
instance of a single trusted system [Ref. 8:p. 1]. It has a
single TCB, referred to as a Network Trusted Computing Base
(NTCB), which is partitioned among the network components
[Ref. 4:p. XIV]. Collectively, the NTCB components enforce a
well-defined network security policy, despite vulnerable
communications paths and asynchronous operations.
The network must possess a coherent security architecture
and design that correctly and unambiguously specify all
security-related interfaces and services. A reference monitor
must be implemented to mediate all access requests of subjects
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to objects. Examples of "single trusted systems" include
packet switched communications networks, end-to-end encryption
systems and local area networks [Ref. 4:p. XV].
As a single trusted system, the network is evaluated using
the requirements of TCSEC as interpreted for the network
environment. In order to be accredited within a given class,
each requirement for that class must be satisfied by the
network as a whole [Ref. 4: p. XVII]. The resulting network
certification is a technical statement about the strength (in
terms of security) of the system, regardless of its environment
[Ref. 8:p. 1].
Within each evaluation class, requirements are specified in
terms of security features. For example, to be accredited at
the B3 level, the network must demonstrate the following policy
features [Ref. 4:pp. 90-124]: discretionary access control,
protection against object reuse, data labeling, mandatory
access control, identification and authentication, and
auditing.
The alternative evaluation procedure is to view a trusted
network as a collection of trusted components or AISs. Using
this technique, each component or AIS is individually rated and
certified to process sensitive information at a single level,
or over a range of levels simultaneously. Then, elaborate
component connection and interconnection rules are provided to
ensure that the resulting network in no way violates the
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mandatory security policy. This view does not offer the same
formal assurances as are achieved in a single trusted system.
As previously mentioned, Part II of TNI describes a number
of additional security services that are not reflected in Part
I; nor do they effect the accreditation class of any network.
However, each security service contained in Part II, is
potentially significant given a particular network environment.
Therefore, a trusted network is assigned three qualitative
ratings to reflect how well it performs each service. The
evaluation criteria for each service includes functionality,
strength of mechanism and assurance. Table I lists these
network security services, the criteria and an evaluation range
for each criterion [Ref. 4:pp. 163-192].
Thus, TNI provides technical guidance for the evaluation
and specification of security control in computer networks. It
focuses on policy and assurance features necessary to achieve
certain levels of accreditation.
Of the security requirements and services addressed in the
TNI, many are implemented with the help of security protocols.
For this reason, security protocols must be free of design and
implementation deficiencies which can effect the services
rendered. The TNI describes certain techniques, such as formal
verification and testing which can assure correctness of the
protocol design and operation. What remains outstanding are
standard security protocols of verified designs, that will
simplify the evaluation and certification process, and provide
15
the necessary security and assurance requirements for various
network environments.
TABLE I
TNI PART II, NETWORK SECURITY SERVICES



































































A. PROTOCOL FUNCTIONS AND DESIGNS
Protocols perform the functions necessary for successful
communications among separate entities in computer networks.
They resolve the complexities of different data formats and
exchange conventions, and provide common, well-defined
interfaces among communicating processes.
A multitude of tasks must be accomplished to provide for
the efficient and reliable transfer of information between
two networked systems. Defining a single protocol to perform
these tasks would be an extremely complex endeavor. Instead,
several protocols exist within a computer network
architecture, to operate cooperatively, in order to carry out
the communications function.
The Compatibility Principle states that security
protocols must be designed to function cooperatively within
the existing network architecture. Security protocols must
be compatible with the structure of conventional protocols
and uphold—the -security requirements.
In this chapter, the layered architecture of network
protocols will be presented. Then, the two most prominent
protocol reference models will be briefly outlined, and an
appropriate framework for the design of security protocols
will be recommended. Finally, a number of design objectives
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for the successful development of security protocols will be
considered.
B. A LAYERED ARCHITECTURE
The contemporary approach to expressing a network
architecture applies a layered design technique. The
protocol tasks necessary for successful communications are
partitioned into several "horizontal" layers which form a
functional hierarchy. Each layer performs a subset of the
functions required to communicate with another system of the
same layer [Ref. 9:p. 3].
Consider for example, the transfer of a file via a
computer network, from its place of storage in one computer,
to a user of another computer system. The procedure involves
several separate tasks which can be distributed throughout
many distinct protocol layers. First, a communications path
must be established between the two computers. Then, some
negotiation of data formats and transfer rates may be
required. Eventually, the actual file transfer will occur,
accompanied by procedural requirements such as
acknowledgment, flow control and error detection. Finally,
the connection must be smoothly terminated.
In a communications task such as just described, several
relatively independent protocol layers may be employed. In
the highest layer, a protocol interface may be necessary
between the application process and the computer.
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Intermediate- layer protocols must establish and maintain the
communications path, and control the flow of data between the
two host computers. Lower-layer protocols are responsible
for error checking and routing data packets to their proper
destinations.
In order to ensure the efficient and reliable transfer of
information, an upper- layer protocol may call upon the
functions of the next lower layer. In turn, the
intermediate-layer protocol may engage the services of the
lowest- layer protocol. Thus, a layered architecture helps
distribute an extremely complex communications problem among
a number of more well-defined and manageable tasks.
Another important benefit is realized from this layered
design; the modularity of protocol layering enhances
flexibility in network communications. It may still be
unrealistic to assume that one protocol may be easily
substituted for another within a particular layer. However,
changes to any existing protocol can be made with a lesser
affect upon the functionality of those above it.
C. PROTOCOL REFERENCE MODELS
A protocol suite is a structured set of protocols that
executes the network communications function. Two
independent protocol suites were designed as models for the
description and specification of network architectures. The
first of these protocol reference models (PRMs) was developed
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by DOD; the second PRM was sponsored by the International
Standards Organization (ISO). In this section, an overview
of each model will be presented, highlighting the motivation
for, and underlying framework of each network protocol
architecture. Additionally, an appropriate reference model
for the development of security protocols will be suggested.
1. The DOD Protocol Reference Model
DOD was first to develop a standard suite of
communications protocols. Its motivation for a military
standard protocol is revealed in two major trends relating to
computer communications within DOD [Ref. 10:p. 2]:
- The rapid proliferation of computerized military devices,
and the need to integrate equipment of multiple vendors.
- The wide distribution of data communications networks,
especially local-area networks.
These trends generated the requirement for a common set of
protocols that would satisfactorily support communications in
heterogeneous network environments.
At the time the DOD protocol suite was promulgated,
competing vendors were promoting their own, proprietary
solutions for communication between computers. Stallings
identified a number of advantages resulting from the issuance
of DOD standards [Ref 10 :p. 3]:
- Interoperability: By mandating the use of a common set
of protocols on all DOD equipment, interoperability was
achieved.
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- Vendor productivity and efficiency: Since protocol
conversion capabilities were no longer a concern, vendors
wishing to support DOD could concentrate on developing
standard protocols.
- Competition: The existence of standards theoretically
encouraged competition by fostering interoperability of
equipment from various manufacturers.
- Procurement simplification: Procurement deliberations
were no longer required to consider protocol-conversion
costs.
The DOD protocol reference model is based on a
layered architecture. The complex communications task is
divided into separate functions which are performed by the
various network entities. Four relatively independent layers
are identified [Ref. 10:p. 5]:
- Network Access Layer: As the lowest layer, its function
is to provide for the exchange of data between a host
computer and the network to which it is attached. Protocols
within this layer must be capable of controlling access to,
and routing data between various devices of the same network.
- Internet Layer: This layer is responsible for
communications between entities of two or more different
networks. Internet protocols must be implemented in gateways
(processors between independent networks) as well as in
network host computers. These protocols are responsible for
21
routing data among hosts and processes, across multiple
networks
.
- Host-to-host Layer: The reliability function is
concentrated in this layer for both internet and intranet
data exchange. Protocols of the host-to-host layer are
responsible for error checking and proper sequencing of
transferred data.
- Process Layer: This layer encompasses those protocols
needed to support specific applications. For each individual
application, such as file transfer or electronic mail, a
separate protocol is needed to perform the communications
function.
DOD standard protocols have been developed for the
three upper layers of the PRM. The functions of the network
access layer are performed by international standard
protocols.
In order to accomplish a reliable information
exchange, protocols of a particular layer must occasionally
interact with immediately adjacent layers. For example, a
protocol of the internet layer may utilize the services of
the network access layer. However, protocols are not
restricted to this procedure; application-specific protocols
of the process layer may be designed to interface directly
with the protocols of any one of the lower layers.
The DOD PRM was promulgated in response to an
immediate need for interoperability and communications
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between multiple-vendor computer networks. Coincident to the
development of a DOD protocol model, a similar, yet
independent effort was underway by the International
Standards Organization (ISO). This organization continues to
sponsor research and development of protocols to be included
within an international PRM. However, DOD was unable to wait
for these international standards to evolve and stabilize.
In the next sections, we describe the international standards
model and then provide a brief comparison of the ISO and DOD
communications architectures.
2. The ISO Protocol Reference Model
The ISO-sponsored protocol model was developed in
order to define standards of communications between
heterogeneous computer systems. This protocol design
framework is referred to as the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) protocol reference model. The term OSI is intended to
imply the mutual recognition and support of standard services
and protocols by distinctly different computer systems.
One of the most fundamental issues for the ISO
protocol subcommittee involved the layering of protocol
functions. In order to successfully distribute the
communications task, the committee needed to determine the
appropriate number of protocol layers, and the services to be
performed within each layer. Too many layers would
unnecessarily complicate the engineering process of
describing and integrating several protocol layers. Too few
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layers would mean protocols would have to perform a wide
range of functions, which would have imposed undue
complexities in their designs. Ultimately, the ISO
subcommittee agreed upon seven functional layers which serve
as the basis for the OSI architecture. These OSI layers are
briefly described as follows [Ref. 9, 11, 12]:
- Physical Layer: This is the lowest of the seven layers.
The protocol of the Physical layer is concerned with the
transmission of the raw-bit stream. It specifies the
electrical representations of Is and Os, and details the
procedure for opening, closing and maintaining the physical
connection. The Physical layer protocol supports a full
duplex, half duplex or simplex connection, and provides a
multiplexing function for multiple data links over a single
physical connection.
- Data Link Layer: This layer is responsible for
converting an unreliable transmission channel into a reliable
communications path. Its principle services include managing
communications between directly-connected systems and
providing low-level error detection. The Data Link protocol
breaks up the raw-bit stream into frames and applies a
checksum to each frame, in order to detect transmission
errors. It also guarantees that data is correctly
transmitted and received by repeatedly transmitting each
frame until its receipt is properly acknowledged.
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Additionally, the Data Link protocol provides flow control of
data frames, so receiving buffers will not be overwhelmed.
- Network Layer: The Network layer protocol performs the
routing and relay functions in point-to-point networks. It
is responsible for establishing, maintaining and terminating
connections between transport entities. Among its many
services, the Network layer provides both normal and
expedited data transfer, error detection, flow control and
data sequencing. It can also provide multiplexing of two or
more connections over a single network data link.
- Transport Layer: This layer is responsible for the
reliable exchange of data between processes of distinctly
independent systems. It ensures that data units are
delivered in the proper sequence, without error, loss, or
duplication. Additionally, the Transport layer protocol
optimizes the use of network resources and guarantees a
particular level of service quality for the upper layers.
All details of the Transport service are effectively hidden
from the communicating application processes.
In order to provide a wide range of functions, there
are currently five classes of Transport protocols. Among the
possible services offered, the Transport protocol may provide
connection establishment and termination, error recovery,
multiplexing, flow control and error detection. For any
particular connection, the Transport protocol requirements
will largely depend upon the reliability of the network
*25
layer, and can be negotiated during the establishment of
communications.
- Session Layer: The Session layer protocol provides a
means for two processes to establish and maintain a
connection for a definite period of communications, called a
session. The Session layer protocol may support a duplex,
half duplex or simplex dialogue. Additionally, it may employ
a checkpoint mechanism, such that in case of transmission
failure, data retransmission will commence from the last
checkpoint.
- Presentation Layer: This layer is concerned with
providing an acceptable syntax for the exchange of data
between applications. The Presentation layer protocol
resolves differences in data formats and representations. It
allows communicating processes to select an agreeable syntax
from a variety of data formats. It may also perform a data
transformation function, such as text compression or
encryption. One protocol of the presentation layer is
referred to as the Virtual Terminal Protocol (VTP). The VTP
converts specific terminal characteristics used by
applications programs, to generic or virtual terminal
features which are capable of direct computer interface.
- Application Layer: This layer provides services directly
to the application processes. It is the only interface
between the user and the OSI environment. While the content
of the Application layer remains at the discretion of the
*26
Application process, a few widely-used application-layer
protocols do exist, such as the file transfer protocol and
the electronic mail protocol.
3. An Appropriate Protocol Reference Model
The OSI model provides direct interaction between two
peer entities at the physical layer. At all other layers,
each entity communicates not with its peer in another host,
but with its own-host entities in layers directly above and
below it. Each entity invokes the functions of the next
lower layer in order to perform a service for the next higher
layer. Thus every communication must undergo seven layers of
processing. However, where efficiency is a concern,
virtually null layers may be implemented in order to
streamline communications.
Still, this aspect of the OSI architecture remains
quite different from operational procedures in the military
model. In the DOD-sponsored environment, the use of each
individual layer is optional. An upper layer entity may
directly invoke the services of any one of the lower protocol
layers.
Figure 3.1 provides a comparison between the DOD and
OSI PRMs. ISO has acceptable protocol standards at each of
the seven OSI layers and work remains in progress for the
development of additional protocols, primarily in the upper
layers. In contrast, DOD has issued standard protocol
designs only for the upper three layers of the DOD PRM.
*27















Figure 3.1. A Comparison of the OSI and the DOD
Communications Architectures.
These as well as other differences exist between the
DOD and OSI protocol reference models. As a result, systems
supported by one set of protocols are incompatible with those
supported by the other protocol suite.
Because of the nearly universal acceptance and use of
the OSI PRM, vendors wishing to support DOD must incur an
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additional implementation burden. Furthermore, while
international standards continue to expand and improve, DOD
standards are relatively static. For these reasons, DOD has
declared its intention to gradually shift from its own
protocol designs to international standards.
It should be relatively clear from this discussion
which of the two protocol reference models would most likely
be appropriate for the development of security protocols.
The OSI model has received a nearly world-wide acceptance and
is continuously evolving to provide new and more
sophisticated functions and services. Its primary purpose is
to provide a common basis for the coordination of standards
development, to facilitate systems interconnection. It is
within the OSI model, that security protocols should be
designed to function.
D. DESIGN OBJECTIVES FOR COMPATIBILITY
The OSI reference model provides a solid framework in
which standard protocols may be developed. Currently, a
number of ISO standards exist at all levels of the OSI model.
Most recently, ISO has issued standards for an
internetworking protocol, a transport protocol and a session
layer protocol [Ref. 11]. As the ISO work continues, the
need for compatibility becomes increasingly important in the
development of security protocols. In pursuit of
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compatibility, a number of design objectives may be applied
to the security-protocol development:
The service provided by a security protocol should not
unnecessarily duplicate the functions of those already
established [Ref. 13:p. 17]. A duplication of function only
serves to increase the overhead incurred in protocol
processing. If the proper OSI layer is chosen, the security
protocol can utilize the services of existing protocols
[Ref. 14:p. 11].
The security protocol should specify the layer in which
the security service will be implemented. Otherwise, the
security service would have to be implemented in different
layers of separate systems, resulting in incompatibility
between the two systems [Ref. 14:p. 11].
Security protocols should avoid violating the layer
independence that is fundamental to the OSI reference model
[Ref. 13:p. 17]. Standards developed within this framework
enjoy the advantages of modularity and evolvability . Changes
or enhancements can be made to the services of any particular
layer without significantly disrupting the protocols of other
layers. In order for specifications to be maintained abreast
of current network technology, security protocols must
preserve the independent nature of OSI layers.
Protocol designs should avoid all unnecessary
complexities in order to facilitate the process of
verification. Boundaries and interfaces must be clearly
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defined, and the trusted portions of security protocols
should be minimized [Ref. 15:p. 131].
Protocol designs should seek to minimize the number of
alternative ways in which to implement a security service
[Ref. 13:p. 17]. This effort will help simplify the process
of evaluating protocol designs and issuing standards.
Additionally, it will help clarify acceptable interoperations
between security protocols and other network protocols.
Considerations for these objectives will help assure
security protocol designs are compatible with conventional
protocols. Compatibility with existing ISO standards will
simplify the evaluation process and accelerate the
standardization of protocol designs. Moreover, compatible
security protocols will promote the underlying philosophy of
"open" systems, by facilitating the protected exchange of
information across heterogeneous computer systems.
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IV. THE INCLUSION PRINCIPLE
A. LAYERED PROTOCOL OPERATIONS
In the OSI hierarchy, upper layer protocols define elements
of large granularity and describe single operations that
accomplish many things. In contrast, lower layer protocols
identify objects of smaller granularity and specify conventions
to complete single taskings. The combined efforts of all
protocol layers are essential to the success of network
communications
.
The Inclusion Principle is formulated with the use of a
layered approach, for example, in the OSI reference model. The
Inclusion Principle is comprised of two interrelated concepts:
(1) Whatever the higher- layer operations and data aggregates, a
complete set of more primitive functions and data elements must
be provided at the lower-layers. In other words, intermediate
and lower-layer security protocols must be included explicitly
to support high-layer network security and communications. (2)
These subordinate protocols must protect at the same
sensitivity levels as the upper-layer operations they support.
For example, a Top Secret (TS) protocol , that provides secure
network communications at the TS level, must be supported by
lower-layer protocols which also protect at the TS level.
Thus, the Inclusion Principle maintains that in facilitating
secure communications, protocols at a high layer properly
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include protocols at the lower layers. Further, their
sensitivity levels are the same.
Consider Figure 4.1 in which the layers of protocols are
separated by horizontal dotted lines and levels of
sensitivities are separated by the vertical dotted lines. The
Inclusion Principle has the partitioning effect that all the
protocols are compartmentalized by levels and graduated by
layers. This type of layered structure involves a subtle
















Whereas, in the OSI reference model, a suite of lower-layer
protocols may support some or all protocols of a higher-layer
protocol suite, in our Inclusion Principle-based model, every
compartment of a higher- layer protocol suite has its own suite
of lower-layer protocols. In other words, one cannot use the
lower-layer suite of protocols in one compartment to support a
higher- layer protocol of a different compartment, since
different compartments have different sensitivities for their
corresponding protocols. Thus, the layer structure in our
model further partitions the protocols into compartments of
different sensitivity levels. This feature does not exist in
the OSI reference model.
In this chapter, the Inclusion Principle will be examined
and justified. Its two concepts will be separately addressed.
In the next section, the need for security in all protocol
layers will be demonstrated. Then, in section C, the rationale
for security protocols which protect at individual sensitivity
levels will be provided. Finally, in the last section, several
examples will be given to compare the protocols needed to
support secure network communications at- different sensitivity
levels
.
B. A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In the absence of standard security protocols, a number of
proprietary designs have evolved. Many of these designs focus
on providing security at the OSI network or transport layers.
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It is also possible to provide network security at several
protocol layers. Indeed, in the Security Addendum to the OSI
architecture, the ISO describes several security services and
discusses where in the seven layer OSI architecture they may be
placed [Ref. 13]. A summary matrix of the security services
and corresponding OSI layers is provided in Table II.
TABLE II
OSI SUMMARY MATRIX OF SECURITY SERVICES AND LAYERS
Layer















Y - Yes, service shall be optionally provided
N N Y Y N Y N
N N Y Y N N Y
Y N Y Y N Y N
N N Y Y N Y N
N N N N N Y N
Y N N N N N Y
N N Y Y N Y N
N N N N N Y N
N N Y N N Y N
N N N Y N N N
N N Y Y N Y N
N N N N N Y N
N N N N N Y N
While the OSI Security Addendum recognizes a need for
security protocols, the Inclusion Principle considers the ISO
recommendations inadequate for ensuring secure communications
in a multilevel network environment. Security cannot be
capriciously supplied at various layers of protocol reference
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model. Rather, each layer of the entire protocol architecture
must be properly secured in order to support multilevel secure
network communications. Furthermore, as will be thoroughly
justified in the next section, lower layers of protocols must
be subsumed by their higher layers of protocols with the same
sensitivity level, i.e., in the same compartment. For example,
higher-layer protocols may be concerned with identification and
authentication of communicating processes classified, say, at




responsibilities for preserving the integrity of transmitted
data or securing the communications medium between network
hosts at the secret level. In order to ensure secure and
reliable network communications, security must be provided in
all layers of the protocol reference model.
Certain security services are more naturally realized in
the lower layers. But the ISO philosophy of placing a
communications service in the lowest layer possible to achieve
the desired goal, should not be misconstrued. Just because
link encryption is performed at the Data Link layer, for
example, does not mean that encryption need not be addressed at
the higher layers. It is far more likely that additional
encryption will be required at, and above, the network layer.
Further, the link encryption protocols for the top secret
(TS) sensitivity level should be different from those for the
secret (S) sensitivity level. Since the former supports TS
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communications, the encryption algorithm should be far more
complex and secure than the algorithm used to encrypt
communications at the secret level. This is the application of
our Inclusion Principle that is lacking in the ISO reference
model
.
In the ISO model, the security that can be provided by the
lower-layer protocols is not sufficient for reliable and secure
network communications. Consider the security requirement for
individual identification and accountability across a network.
This service must be provided by. a high- layer protocol.
Individual accountability has no significance, say, at the
transport layer. Since the transport layer is host-to-host, it
cannot know whether a particular user is accessing data from a
particular file. [Ref. 16:p. 8]. Therefore, security must also
be addressed at the upper layers.
Additionally, if a security service is provided by an
upper-layer protocol, intermediate- and lower-layer protocols
must ensure no disruption of that service. In other words,
high-layer security must be properly preserved by the lower-
layer protocol entities. An important and related concern is
that of requesting and passing protocol security services
between protocol layers. A full suite of security protocols
(e.g., security protocols at every layer) is necessary to
support secure communications. As described by the OSI model,
the (n+1) -entity must be able to obtain the desired protection
by invoking the security services directly within the (n)-
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layer, or by requesting the service from the (n-l)-layer. In
the latter case, the (n)-layer must be trusted to accurately
map the (n+1 ) -service request to the (n-1) -layer entity
[Ref. 13, p. 18]. Thus, security protocols are needed at
intermediate layers of the protocol architecture, if for no
other reason than to pass security- related information from one
layer to another.
To summarize, a complete architecture of security protocols
is needed to provide sufficient protection of network processes
and data. Upper-layer protocols are needed to provide vital
security services and must be adequately supported by
intermediate and lower-layer entities. In turn, intermediate
and lower-layer protocols are needed to uphold higher-layer
security and perform additional security functions that are
unattainable at higher layers. Layer entities must also act as
trusted intermediaries which pass security information between
layers. The Inclusion Principle requires that security
protocols not only be layered, but that they also include
essential supporting protocols.
C. SECURITY PROTOCOLS WITH SENSITIVITY LEVELS
The second aspect of the Inclusion Principle is concerned
with the sensitivity levels or the classification of data, and
the protocols which protect and manipulate that data. The
Inclusion Principle maintains that a separate suite of security
protocols is needed for each sensitivity level processed.
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While this contention has far-reaching design implications for
network security, such specialized protocols are considered
essential for preserving the security of classified data.
In the DOD environment, information is classified according
to the amount of damage to national security that would result
from its unauthorized disclosure. For example, when improper
disclosure would result in some "damage", the information is
considered Confidential. When such a disclosure would cause
"serious damage", the information is classified Secret.
Likewise, when unauthorized disclosure of information is likely
to cause "grave damage" to national security, that information
is guarded as Top Secret. [Ref. 17]
In line with these definitions, the DOD requires that
various levels of classified information be separately
maintained. We refer to this requirement as
compartmentalization. Further, the degree of protection
accorded the information is directly related to its security
classification. For example, confidential information may be
maintained in a locked, steel filing cabinet, equipped with a
General Services Administration (GSA) -approved combination
lock. However, top secret information must be stored in a GSA
vault or security container. Additionally, this vault must be
protected by an alarm system or by a manned guard during non-
working hours [Ref. 17].
From these security policy descriptions, it may be
intuitively obvious that separate security protocols are needed
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to process different levels of classified data. However,
further justification is provided in the discussion that
follows.
Underlying the Inclusion Principle is the issue of
reliability. It is quite natural that only the strongest and
most reliable protocols be used to protect the most highly
classified data. Moreover, it is evident that some protocols
are not as reliable as others. For example, consider the Unix-
based TCP/IP protocols—those designed for point-to-point
network communications can generally be relied upon for
consistent, high-quality service. But those provided for
broadcast communications could not guarantee a broadcast
message would be received by all intended parties.
In this particular situation, the deficiency in broadcast
communications was due to minor hardware and software flaws.
However, in some cases, protocol operations may be
intentionally designed without many assurance features. The
ISO connectionless operation is one example. Connectionless
service was designed for those contexts in which the overhead
of connection establishment and maintenance is unjustified.
The point of this discussion is that reliable security
protocols are of greater concern when the data to be protected
is of a higher sensitivity level. Moreover, it is senseless to
use highly-reinforced security protocols to protect less
sensitive data.
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Reliability is an expensive proposition; it is expensive to
design and test reliable security protocols. Additionally, it
is very costly, in terms of machine resources and processing
time, to implement them. Hence, it is unwise to use the most
trusted and redundant security protocols to protect data of
lower sensitivity levels.
With compartmentalization, we can isolate the reliability
issue from one compartment to another. The use of the virtual-
machine concept may confine each compartment to a separate
virtual machine, for example.
In addition to the reliability and expense considerations,
data integrity is a significant concern. In a multilevel
secure network, data and processes must be separately
maintained by their sensitivity levels. Subjects of one
classification cannot be allowed to penetrate compartments or
connections reserved for other classifications.
If the network is "trusted", communications between
processes are permitted only in accordance with a well-defined
security policy, such as the Bell-LaPadula model. In this
model, two processes can communicate only if the following
Security Level (SL) conditions are enforced [Ref. 18:p. 64]:
Process A can read information from Process B only if:
SL(A) >= SL(B) (Simple Security Rule)
Process A can write information to Process B only if:
SL(A) <= SL(B) (* Property)
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This restriction renders it imperative that processes
communicating across a multilevel secure network share
equivalent security levels.
Consider the consequences of data that is contaminated with
multiple sensitivity levels. Suppose for example, because of
some faulty protection mechanism, some top secret data spills
into a secret compartment of the network. The access controls
for that compartment are designed to protect at the secret
level. Therefore, as other secret data is being properly
disclosed, top secret may be inadvertently revealed.
This discrepancy is but one concern. Another consideration
is the significant loss of control over top secret information
in the first place. Thus, it is essential to rigidly enforce
the separation of programs and data by their sensitivity
levels.
The Inclusion Principle provides a natural extension of the
Bell-LaPadula properties by helping to maintain the partitions
between different classifications of data. Since processes
must share an identical protocol in order to communicate, a
separate security protocol for each sensitivity level would
effectively prohibit communications between processes of
different security levels.
Whether the concern is reliable communications,
implementation expense or data integrity, separate security
protocols for different data sensitivities provide a viable
design alternative. Security protocols can be customized for
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the sensitivity levels of the data they protect. In turn, the
cost of using a particular security protocol will be
appropriate to the level of classified data protected.
Finally, these specialized security protocols will help ensure
the integrity of sensitive programs and data, by enforcing
partitions between various sensitivity levels.
D. SENSITIVITY LEVEL FEATURES OF SECURITY PROTOCOLS
Upholding the Inclusion Principle. we can envision many
distinguishing features of security protocols which would vary
considerably depending upon the sensitivity level of data to be
protected. In this section, we will compare the protocols
needed to support secure communications at different
sensitivity levels. To illustrate, we will consider two
instances of secure network communications; one at the top
secret level and another at the confidential level. Many of
the security services included in this discussion are drawn
from those identified in Part II of the TNI.
Suppose two classified processes wish to communicate across
a secure multilevel network. First, the network must ensure
the authenticity of each process. If the processes desire to
communicate at the top secret level, the authentication
procedure might involve a complex cryptographic technique,
combined with a two or three-way handshaking protocol and a
time stamp. In contrast, if communication is to take place at
a confidential level, each process might authenticate merely by
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providing a secret password to the network. Thus, the
authentication features of security protocols in the
Application layer, the Presentation layer, and possibly even
the Session layer would be affected by the sensitivity levels
of the communicating processes.
To provide these processes with secure and reliable
transmissions, the network must guarantee a certain degree of
data integrity. This service would normally be provided by the
Presentation layer where code and format conversions are
performed. To support communications at the confidential
level, the security protocol might have to detect and report
any unauthorized alteration, insertion, deletion or replay of
data. For top secret communications, the security protocol may
in addition, have to attempt a certain amount of recovery from
these random errors or unauthorized modifications. Moreover, a
protocol that protects confidential transmissions would be more
likely to have a higher probability of undetected errors, than
one which protects top secret communications. Thus, those
protocol features responsible for preserving data integrity are
also altered by the data's sensitivity level.
Similarly, a security protocol that provides non-
repudiation of a confidential message, would be different from
one that provides this service for a top secret exchange. Non-
repudiation prevents a sender from disavowing a legitimate
message or the receiver from denying its receipt
44
[Ref. 4:p. 172]. A digital signature protocol would be
incorporated in the Presentation layer to provide a non-
repudiation service. As with any other security service
involving encryption, the particular digital signature employed
would be largely determined by the strength of the
cryptographic cipher, and in turn, by the sensitivity level of
protected data. Obviously, for a top secret message exchange,
the strength of the encrypting algorithm would be much greater
than that needed for a confidential exchange.
In order to ensure the availability of communications, the
network must maintain some continuity of operations despite
external attack or internal failure. To provide such
assurance, Denial of Service (DOS) protocols may be implemented
in the Transport or Network layers. For example, a DOS
protocol could initiate a request-response message to detect
the availability of a remote peer-entity. Since these protocol
mechanisms increase network overhead, their use must be
judiciously controlled. Therefore, to protect a confidential
communications path, perhaps only one DOS protocol would be
used. Whereas, to protect top secret communications, three or
more such protocols might be implemented. Here, redundant
security features ensure greater communications availability.
These are just some of the many ways in which security
protocols are likely to change in response to requirements of
different sensitivity levels. Additional protocol features
which could vary with the sensitivity of data could include the
45
number or significance of negotiable services, acceptable error
rates, acknowledgment conventions, and buffering capabilities.
In the preceding discussion, we have attempted to
demonstrate the two properties of the Inclusion Principle.
First, we have shown that in order to ensure acceptable network
communications, upper-layer processes and data must be properly
supported by intermediate and lower-layer protocols. Second,
to achieve secure multilevel communications, an entire suite of
protocols must be designed for each sensitivity level.
Together, they introduce the concept of compartmentalization of
security protocols and aggregates on the basis of sensitivity
levels. This concept is orthogonal to the notion of layers.
Thus, of security protocols, the Inclusion Principle dictates
both horizontal layers of protocols and aggregates, and
vertical compartments of sensitivity levels.
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V. THE SUPPORT PRINCIPLE
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY MECHANISMS
The TCSEC and subsequently the TNI were published to
provide a means of evaluating specific security and assurance
features available in "trusted" computer systems. Therefore,
when seeking a certifiable design for a secure computer
network, a major objective is to incorporate security
mechanisms which will satisfy TCSEC assurance requirements.
Many factors combine to provide a particular level of
assurance in a secure computer network. Certainly, security
protocols are essential to this effort. However, a protocol
is merely a set of rules designed to govern the exchange of
data. In order to fulfill the TCSEC/TNI requirements,
protocol designs must be properly implemented in the system's
hardware and software. This then, is the essence of the
Support Principle— appropriate security mechanisms must be
provided within the system's hardware and software to support
the proper operation of security protocols.
In this chapter, a wide variety of mechanisms that
support security protocols will be considered. To facilitate
this discussion, examples will be drawn from actual computer
and network systems currently in use or under development.
Since a comprehensive review of each system is not possible
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within the scope of this thesis, only the system's most
salient security features will be presented.
B. HARDWARE PROTECTION MECHANISMS
Computer hardware is used extensively in the protection
of the system and user code as well as system and user data.
It is instrumental in affecting various memory management
techniques and aids in the control of multiple execution
states. Additionally, separate hardware may be used to
provide security through isolation, while also improving
system performance.
1. Memory Protections
Memory management schemes are utilized to provide
protection of memory- resident software and data from each
other. Historically, in order to allow multiprogramming in
computers, certain hardware mechanisms were designed to
manage multiple processes and their data simultaneously
residing in the memory. These techniques provide protection
against damage or destruction to data and code, whether they
were in primary or in virtual memories.
In the earliest memory protection schemes, primary
memory was parceled into many separate regions, each of which
had its own address space. Each resident process and its
data were allocated only a certain memory region in which to
operate. This restriction protected each user's memory
region from being accessed by another user's process.
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Several hardware techniques are used to control
access to multiple memory regions. One method uses special
CPU registers, called base/bound registers. The base
register holds the lower address limit for the user process,
while the bound register contains the upper address limit.
When the CPU interprets an instruction, the address to the
memory is checked against the addresses stored in these
registers. The CPU ensures that the address to the memory is
between the user's limits, i.e., in its region.
While this method protects- itself from other user
processes, it does not protect a process from inadvertently
damaging its own code or data, by specifying an .erroneous
address within its own memory region. Moreover, considerable
processing time may be required in order to reload base/bound
registers with each new user process. Therefore, the degree
of multiprogramming will be limited by the number of sets of
base/bound registers and the amount of acceptable processing
overhead [Ref. 19:p. 110].
Another memory protection technique is found in the
IBM 360 series computer. This system introduced the use of
"locks" and "keys" to protect main memory [Ref. 19:p. 111].
A lock in the form of an identification number is assigned to
each individual block of memory. Identical numbers (locks)
may be assigned to two or more memory blocks, simultaneously.
Each user process must provide the matching keys to the
memory blocks it needs to access.
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The advantage of the lock and key mechanism lies in
the ability of a user process to access multiple blocks of
the memory. However, the number of individual blocks into
which the memory can be partitioned is limited by the number
of locks. In turn, the number of memory locks is limited to
the number of bits allocated to the identification number.
In the case of IBM 360, there are only 4 bits, i.e., 16 locks
available [Ref. 19:p. 112].
A lock and key mechanism could offer a certain degree
of support for network security protocols. Suppose for
example, an individual lock mechanism is implemented to
protect each security protocol. Then the user process need
only present the proper keys for the protocols it needed to
access. For security reasons, the maintenance and
distribution of memory keys would be an important policy
issue. In one design, the operating system could maintain
custody of all the keys. Then, a user process would have to
demonstrate a "need-to-know" in order to gain access to a
particular memory key and its corresponding security
protocol. In this way, the operating system could be certain
to verify every access request.
The layered structure of communications protocols
facilitates an alternate approach to the administration of
memory keys. While the operating system might still maintain
keys to all memory locks, higher level security protocols
could also hold keys to lower level security protocols. In
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this sense, "higher" and "lower" could mean the relative
positions of these security protocols within the OSI
reference model. Conversely, these terms might refer to the
level of protection provided by the security protocols. In
any case, higher level protocols would be permitted access to
lower level protocols, without further intervention by the
operating system. This method would reduce the overhead
associated with processing access requests and distributing
keys, but it would also lessen the security of the overall
system.
An additional point is worth mentioning—because of
the limited number of locks available for main memory, it is
unrealistic to expect each security protocol to be
individually locked. Instead, it may be more reasonable for
one lock to secure all security protocols which protect at
the same security level. In this way, a single key could
provide access to only one level of classified information.
The limitations of these early techniques promoted
the development of the memory protection mechanisms in use
today. The notion of segmentation was designed to effect the
requirement for nearly unlimited numbers of base/bound
registers [Ref. 6:p. 205]. Here, segmentations are applied
to the virtual memory which can be arbitrarily large and
supported on disks by the operating system.
Segmentation is implemented in the hardware by means
of a segment table. This table indicates the segment numbers
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and their base and limit addresses. The operating system
maintains the segment table. The CPU interprets the virtual
addresses of the user programs by consulting the segment
table. In this way, every access request is checked for
legitimacy by the CPU.
Segmentation offers greater protection and more
flexible support for network security protocols. Once again,
protocols may be clustered according to their security
levels. However, using segmentation, all protocols which
protect at the same sensitivity level. could be grouped into a
single segment (rather than behind a single lock). Since
virtual memory offers far more segments than real memory has
locks, segmentation provides security at a finer granularity.
In other words, a greater number of sensitivity levels may be
defined for security protocols and the data and programs they
control
.
Additionally, segmentation provides a way in which
two or more programs may be permitted different access rights
to the same data segment. The access rights are stored as
control bits in the segment table entries associated with
those program segments.
To illustrate how segmentation may be used to support
secure network communications, consider two network
applications which desire to communicate at the "secret"
level. Upon execution of these application programs, their
associated segment tables (or portions thereof) are read into
52
the main memories of the hosts to which they are attached.
The host operating system must then verify each application's
request to access a virtual memory segment, by ensuring the
segment name is entered in the application's segment table.
If access is authorized, the operating system must also check
the control bits associated with this segment table entry, to
determine the type of access (read-only, execute-only, write)
to be granted. In this scenario, at least one entry in each
application's segment table must name the segment in which
the appropriate communication protocols are stored. In order
to communicate, the two applications must use an identical
protocol. Furthermore, that protocol must be able to protect
the communications exchange at the secret level. Thus,
segmentation and virtual memory assist in providing secure
network communications. Segmentation provides hardware-
reinforced protection of security protocols, while these
protocols secure the communications exchange between network
applications.
Another memory management technique, called "paging"
is used in the VMS and DEC systems. Each program is
partitioned into uniformly-sized pages; memory is divided
into the same-sized frames. The operating system maintains a
page table with page numbers and frame addresses. Paging is
designed to make more efficient use of the memory space by
staging extra pages on the secondary storage. Since both
program and data pages are of the same size as the memory
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frame, paging allows necessary programs and data to be
brought into the memory in real time [Ref. 20:pp. 244-254].
We can also assign access privilege bits to the page entries
for access control of pages.
Combining these two approaches to memory management
offers the unique efficiencies of paging and the inherent
protection of segmentation. Paged- segmentation is used for
example, by the Multics operating system and was originally
implemented on a GE/Honeywell-645 machine [Ref. 6:p. 209].
To implement a paged- segmentation scheme, programs
and data are divided into logical segments. Then, each
segment is further partitioned into fixed-sized pages. Each
code or data item is addressed with a segment name and an
offset. The base address of the page table containing all
the pages of the segment is maintained in the segment table.
Thus, two-level address translation is needed--one to
determine the segment number for a named segment, and one to
determine the page and therefore the frame in which the page
resides
.
Support for network security protocols by a paged-
segmentation scheme, would be similar to that provided by
segmentation alone. Protocols which protect at the same
sensitivity level could be stored in a single page-frame.
The operating system would then use the two-tier addressing
scheme to verify access requests for security protocols.
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These memory management techniques emerged from the
desire to accommodate multiprogramming. While they were
primarily designed to make efficient use of system memory,
such implementations are highly effective protection
mechanisms.
2. Multiple Execution States
The advent of multiprogramming generated the need to
protect not only system memory, but other system software.
More specifically, a mechanism was needed to protect the
internal state of the CPU during the execution of a process.
Since the system was expected to support several processes
simultaneously, multiple execution states were required.
A simple multiprogramming system may enforce only two
different states, in order to separate system programs from
user programs. For example, only the operating system should
execute instructions to control I/O for all user's programs.
In order to accommodate these "privileged" instructions, a
privileged state and a user state are defined. Then, when a
user program wishes to accomplish I/O, it issues a system
call, and the hardware switches from user to privileged
state. Finally, the operating system validates the I/O
request and performs the operation accordingly.
In a two-state system, security protocols would also
be considered privileged instructions. Then, in order to
invoke the security protocol, the user would initiate a
system call. The hardware would switch from user to
55
supervisor mode and the operating system would then verify
the user's request. If the request was valid, the operating
system would activate the security protocol on behalf of the
user.
A two-state system is severely limited. Most
significantly, it cannot support multiprogramming. While the
two modes protect the operating system from the user
processes, it does not protect the users from each other.
Most general-purpose computer systems support
multiple execution states which are frequently implemented in
a layered hierarchy. Each state (also called a domain) is
represented as a separate layer, where the "lowest", layer is
the most privileged state. A process executing in the
"lowest" layer has access to all instructions of the "higher"
layers. Whereas, a process executing at the "highest" layer
has very limited access to the more sensitive operations of
the "lower" layers [Ref. 19:p. 117].
The need to support multiple execution states or
domains is firmly grounded in the TCSEC and the TNI. Even a
system that is trusted to the relatively low CI level must
maintain a separate domain for the execution of TCB. This
requirement is essential to ensure TCB code and data
structures will not be inadvertently or maliciously damaged
by untrusted subjects.
The Multics System is an example of a multiple state
machine. The Multics operating system implements multiple
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protection levels in concentric circles (rings) around the
system's hardware. Each ring represents a distinct state.
The most "trusted" processes execute from the inner-most ring
and have access to all other system and user instructions.
A multiple state mechanism offers a number of
favorable implications for network security. First, a
multiple state machine can protect several levels of data and
code simultaneously. Second, its hardware implementation can
provide a strong mechanism to enforce an access control
policy that all users must follow. These capabilities are
important inputs to a reliable and secure network design.
A network host computer with multiple execution
states may be relied upon to enforce the mandatory access
control requirements of a definite security policy. If such
assurance could be achieved in all network hosts, then the
only remaining concern would be to secure the communications
links and interfaces between these components. (Here, we
knowingly disregard the issue of data integrity.
)
However, a multiple state machine is not a panacea
for system security. For example, it cannot enforce
discretionary access controls, since all subjects operating
at inner layers have unlimited access to object of the outer
layers. Without the implementation of discretionary access
controls, a network would be unable to attain any level of
National Computer Security Center (NCSC) certification.
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In addition, multiple execution states do not provide
sufficient layering or controls to allow the concurrent
processing of different levels of classified information.
The multiple state machine was designed to accommodate only
unclassified information. Furthermore, it was built to
operate in a relatively friendly environment of multiple
users. Therefore, the functional definitions of the various
layers do not include provisions for multiple classification
levels.
In order to achieve a multilevel secure system, many
more levels of execution would be needed. At least three
more levels would be required to accommodate .the basic
military model for classified data (e.g., confidential,
secret, and top secret). Furthermore, additional levels may
be desirable to allow for discretionary (need-to-know)
control within each classification level. Of a separate, but
related note, the gates which enforce the separations between
layers must be sufficiently strong to prevent the
intermingling of processes and data from one level of
classification to another.
In a multilevel secure network, all network hosts
must also enforce multilevel security. (Any host that could
not be trusted to provide multilevel security would have to
operate at a system-high level.) Although a multiple state
machine is a desirable component of a secure computer
network, it is not adequate to guarantee the security of
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multiple classifications of information that are concurrently
processed. Multiple execution states are but one of many
security mechanisms needed in the components of a multilevel
secure network.
3 . Dedicated Processors
The proper operation of a multiple state system
requires significant processing power in order to perform
continuous and rapid process switching. For this reason, as
well as several others, separate processors are often
included in the system's design which are dedicated to
performing hardware security functions. Such a processor
might be a microcomputer used to manage file systems and I/O
or a minicomputer used to perform complex computations for
elaborate protection schemes. Additionally, a separate
processor may be used to perform system monitoring and audit
functions.
A current developmental effort which features the use
of specialized processors is the CANEWARE program. Sponsored
by the National Security Agency in contract with Motorola,
INC., CANEWARE is expected to provide high-performance
security services for host computers on long-haul, packet-
switched networks [Ref. 21]. Its two principle devices
include a CANEWARE Front End (CFE) and a CANEWARE Control
Processor (CCP). CFE performs encryption for network data
and enforces access control policies. CCP maintains the
security database, conducts network security audit functions
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and provides centralized administrative monitoring and
control. CANEWARE is being designed for certification by
NCSC, at the B2 level.
Dedicated processors offer additional benefits in
network security through isolation. Protection is enhanced
by isolating security protocols and service mechanisms from
the operating system and from the users' spaces. Also,
system verification is simplified by locating all security
functions in a physically separate device.
The LOgical Coprocessing Kernel (LOCK) project is
currently detailing the design specifications for a security-
enforcing module called the system- independent,, domain-
enforcing, assured reference monitor (SIDEARM) [Ref. 22].
The SIDEARM design specifies a separate computer with
specialized processors and its own memory that controls
access to all resources of the host computer.
All SIDEARM security functions are distributed across
individual processors, which may be real or virtual. For
example, a single processor acts as a front-end filter to
screen out illegal requests from the host. Another processor
manages access to the system's resources, including primary
and secondary memory. Still another processor performs all
audit related functions.
SIDEARM is part of an ambitious development project
to produce a generic hardware-oriented solution for
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multilevel security on general-purpose computers. It is
expected to meet TCSEC requirements for the Al certification.
To summarize, hardware protection mechanisms for
computer and network systems are quite extensive. Memory
protection mechanisms provide for the separation of user and
system processes and data in memory, thus minimizing any
damage that may result in case of inadvertent error.
Multiple execution states and ring structuring allow for
concurrent operation of multiple processes, each with its own
special privileges. Dedicated processors offer advantages in
system performance, while effectively isolating security
functions from the operating system and other users' spaces.
In the next section, software protection mechanisms will be
considered, which complement the security of hardware
mechanisms in the design of multilevel secure networks.
C. SOFTWARE PROTECTION MECHANISMS
In order to ensure sufficient security of system and user
data, software protection mechanisms are needed to augment
and reinforce mechanisms of hardware security. For example,
consider the hardware implementation of multiple execution
states; privileged states run contrary to the principle of
least privilege [Ref. 23:p. 207]. Since processes which
execute from within the privileged state often have more
privileges than required for the task, additional software
mechanisms must be utilized to assure adequate security.
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In this section, we will present three major types of
software security: access control, isolation and encryption.
Once again, examples from the literature will be used to
support our assessments.
1. Access Control
An access control mechanism is used to enforce the
system's security policy by mediating every subject's (e.g.,
program's) request to access an object (e.g., data).
Subjects are usually users, programs or processes, while
objects may be processes, files or other types of data. Two
factors determine the effectiveness of access control
mechanisms: First, each subject must be properly identified
and authenticated. Second, information within the system
which specifies access rights, must be protected from
unauthorized modification [Ref. 23:p. 191].
An access control mechanism may be represented by a
matrix in which each row identifies an individual subject and
each column specifies a certain object. Entries within the
access control matrix indicate the individual subject's
rights, such as read, write or execute, to a specific object.
The access control matrix is a dynamically changing
mechanism. Matrix entries, as well as the subjects and
objects to which they pertain, are likely to be altered
during program execution.
The access control mechanism must monitor all
accesses to objects and all commands to transfer or revoke
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access rights. Additionally, the mechanism must ensure that
the use of physical resources constantly reflects the logical
permissions, as represented by the access control model.
Otherwise, data may be exposed to unauthorized users
[Ref . 23:p. 200]
.
A recent application of an access control mechanism
is provided by the Boeing Aerospace Co. Multilevel Secure
(MLS) Local Area Network (LAN) [Ref. 24]. MLS LAN was
designed to meet the TCSEC Al level of certification. MLS
LAN enforces a security policy which includes discretionary
access control. An access control matrix is utilized to
maintain proper discretionary controls. For packet-oriented
transmissions, the packet source and destination are the
subjects, while each packet is an individual object. In a
connection-oriented system, each connection is viewed as a
separate object. Participants in the connection (subjects)
are then given read and write, or read-only access to the
connection (object).
The access control matrix can be implemented in many
forms. In one version, an access control list, each object
has a separate list which identifies all subjects that have
access to the objects, as well as what that access is
[Ref. 19:p.l69, Ref. 6:p. 215]. The advantage of this
implementation is that different users can share the same
object without the need for a separate object entry in each
user's directory. Moreover, the owner of the object has
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complete control over who has access to the object. The
owner may extend or revoke access rights at any time. The
disadvantage of an access control list is that it is
particularly expensive to search. If each request is
checked, locating the object, then finding the user, and
finally validating the type of access requested can be a very
time consuming process.
Access control lists are used by the Multics system
to protect files in long term storage. Each file segment has
its own list, with an entry for each user. Access list
entries reflect not only the type of access (read, write or
execute) but also the range of Multics rings to .which the
user has access.
An access control matrix may also be implemented by a
capabilities list. A capability is a kind of ticket giving a
subject certain access rights to an object [Ref. 6:p. 218].
A subject may possess any number of capabilities. However, a
capability may only be created through a user's request to
the operating system.
In a capability-based scheme, a process executes
within a certain domain. The domain is a collection of all
current capabilities possessed by the process [Ref 19:p. 169,
Ref. 6:p. 219]. As the process executes, it may call a
subordinate process and pass it certain objects.
Additionally, the subordinate process may have other
capabilities that are not duplicated by the calling process.
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As a result, the subordinate process executes in its own
unique domain.
Since capabilities are used to control access rights,
domains must be protected from normal users. One method is
to isolate the domains in user-inaccessible memory segments.
Another option is to distinguish capabilities from other
objects by tagging them as privileged data. Of course, then
tags must also be protected.
A significant benefit of a capability-based
protection mechanism is that it eliminates the need to search
for current access rights. If a process desires access, it
must present the appropriate capability. However, when an
access right needs to be revoked, the problem is far more
complicated. The access right must first be found in
capabilities which are distributed throughout the system.
Actually, in most systems, access control solutions
use a combination of access lists and capabilities
[Ref. 20:p. 386]. Initially, access control lists are
searched to validate a subject's request for access. Once
approved, a capability is attached to the process which
indicates all subsequent and subordinate access rights. This
approach enhances system performance by minimizing the
revocation problems and improves response times for
subsequent access checks.
In a secure multilevel network, there are many ways
in which access control mechanisms may be utilized. For
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example, in one network configuration, each host could be
responsible for preserving the security of its own data and
all processes originating from it. In this case, each host
might maintain a capabilities list for all current processes.
Among the capabilities listed for each process might be the
level at which the process executes.
Additionally, each host might also maintain an access
control list of all hosts attached to the network and a range
of security levels at which they were trusted to operate.
Then, when process A on Host 1 attempts to communicate with
process B on Host 2, several access control checks would be
initiated. First, Host 1 would check to see the
.
level at
which process A operates, say "secret". Host 1 then checks
the see if this security level is within the range of Host 2.
If so, Host 1 would send the identity and security level of
process A to Host 2. Host 2 would then check to determine if
process B was also operating at the secret level. If so, a
connection between the two processes would be granted.
A different network arrangement might incorporate a
centralized database to maintain a record of access rights of
all hosts on the network. Then some network overseer would
use the information contained in the access control database
to control access to cryptographic connections between
network hosts. Access to a connection would be granted only
if the security level of the connection fell within the
security range of the requesting host.
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2. Isolation
The concept of isolation is as pervasive in software
protection mechanisms as was evident in hardware mechanisms.
In the last section, memory management was shown to be an
essential hardware protection mechanism. Memory protection
techniques provide a logical separation of the memory region
of one user from that of another. Current operating system
software takes this notion of isolation one step further, so
that each user not only has its own logical memory, but
logical files, logical I/O devices, and other logical
resources, as well [Ref. 19:p. 171, Ref. 6:p. 264].
Such an operating system was first made generally
available by IBM and was appropriately named the Virtual
Machine or VM operating system. This system was designed to
accommodate multiple operating systems executing on the same
system's hardware.
A specialized control program operates as an
interface between the system's hardware and two or more
different operating systems. The control program provides
the only existing interaction between system hardware and
subject operating systems. Thus, the control program offers
the benefits of a secondary security layer. Even if the user
exploits a flaw in its own operating system, it may reach




The control program enforces the separation between
different users and their operating systems, and between
different users and the hardware itself. This improved level
of protection is attained at the cost of an additional layer
of complexity in the computer system design.
Isolation is an extremely important consideration in
the design of a multilevel secure network. Its many users
and components systems represent a significant threat to the
integrity and security of network resources. In order to
protect the system, each user must be isolated from all
others, and every access must be strictly controlled.
Additionally, a reliable separation must be maintained
between various levels of classified information.
In a computing network, each host computer may be
responsible for protecting the users and resources within its
perimeter. To do so, each host must be sufficiently isolated
from all other network hosts. This isolation is often
provided in the form of a Trusted Network Interface (TNI).
A TNI acts in a manner similar to the control program
of the VM operating system. In other words, the TNI enforces
the separation between different hosts and between the hosts
and the network itself. The TNI is typically a combination
of software and hardware, and its security functions would
normally include: host authentication, host-to-host
encryption, mandatory and discretionary access control,
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systems audit collection, and the maintenance of multiple
security levels.
The TNI is "trusted" because it has been thoroughly
tested and verified to perform as it was intended. While
each component host must maintain the security and integrity
of information within its own boundary, the TNI will ensure
the protection of information on network connections.
Historically, operating systems have been known to
possess certain inherent weaknesses which can jeopardize the
security of the entire system. Such flaws can include
unreliable I/O processing, ambiguous access policies,
incomplete mediation and trap doors [Ref. 6:p. 276].
Persistent attempts to develop reliable and secure
operating systems have been largely unsuccessful for a number
of reasons. First, the operating system software is
typically very complex. Second, necessary or desirable
security controls are not precisely defined. Finally, it is
difficult to verify the correct operation of the security
controls that are in place. [Ref. 25:p. 142]
One relatively successful approach to the design of a
provably secure operating system focuses on the intrinsic
benefits of isolation. (Note, this is a different type of
isolation than the one discussed previously). The objective
is to isolate all the security mechanisms in a central
locality at the very lowest level of the operating system.
This nucleus or core, called the security kernel, is
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responsible for performing all security functions for the
entire computer system.
The security kernel offers several advantages for a
secure operating system design [Ref. 6:p. 267]:
Separation. By isolating the security mechanisms from
the rest of the operating system and the users' spaces, the
mechanisms are more easily protected from penetration and
modification by unauthorized users.
Unity. Since one set of code is responsible for
performing all security functions, it is easier to develop
and understand that code.
Modifiability . The kernel's modular design facilitates
changes to, and subsequent testing of protection mechanisms.
Compactness. Since it performs only security functions,
the kernel is likely to be relatively small.
Verifiability . If the kernel is small, the verification
process is considerably less complex than that required for
an entire operating system.
Coverage. Since all requests for access must pass
through the security kernel, it can easily check each access
to a protected object.
The effectiveness of the security kernel design
depends largely on a few fundamental design principles.
First, the security policy must be precisely defined. All
access permissions should be completely described by a formal
security model, so the functions that the kernel must provide
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can be properly identified. Second, security mechanisms to
be included in the kernel should be chosen so that
collectively, they will mediate all accesses to protected
objects, in accordance with the specified security policy.
These security mechanisms must be thoroughly protected from
unauthorized access or modification. Finally, system
performance and complexity must be constantly weighed against
the functionality of individual security mechanisms. While
the kernel can be constructed entirely in software,
considerable hardware support may be needed to achieve
adequate performance [Ref. 25 :p. 146]..
There must always be a trade-off as to which security
functions are implemented within the security kernel. It may
seem desirable to include all security related functions
without exception; however, this strategy would defeat one of
the most important features of the security kernel design--
the kernel must remain small so it can be thoroughly and
properly verified. Furthermore, while the security kernel
mediates all access requests to ensure they are permitted by
the system's security policy, some other method must be used
to legitimately access the kernel and to update the security
policy.
One of the most successful implementations of the
security kernel design is the Honeywell Secure Communications
Processor (SCOMP). SCOMP was the first system to be
certified at the Al level by the National Computer Security
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Center [Ref. 1]. While the SCOMP security kernel is
developed entirely of software, it runs on a hardware-
enforced ring mechanism.
Complete mediation and isolation is provided by a
SCOMP Security Protection Module (SPM). SPM is constructed
in hardware, and is situated between the system processor and
the I/O controller and memory. In this way, SPM is able to
mediate all processor requests and validate them prior to
accessing memory or I/O devices. Because SPM is realized in
hardware, I/O device drivers can reside outside the security
kernel
.
The SPM design offers significant benefits.. First,
the security kernel is smaller and less complex because it
does not have to support so many different devices. Second,
I/O capabilities can be modified without affecting the kernel
or its verified design. Finally, fewer kernel calls result
in reduced overhead and improved system performance.
The SCOMP security kernel administers all security
mechanisms and controls all access to the system. Access
control is effected in accordance with the embedded security
policy. The security kernel performs all memory and resource
management, process scheduling, trap and interrupt handling,
and auditing. It supports objects which include segments,
devices and processes, and offers an extensive range of
functions to each process.
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The SCOMP design contributed significantly to its
successful implementation. Honeywell's strategy was to build
the security kernel first, and then construct the remaining
portion of the operating system around it. This approach
helped to minimize the size and complexity of the security
kernel and improve overall performance of the system.
Additionally, SCOMP 's layered design helped ease the
verification process.
The Honeywell SCOMP offers several promising
implications for the design of a secure multilevel network.
First, its certified Al level design could become the
foundation of each network host. Admittedly, a certifiably
secure multilevel network is much more than a collection of
verified hosts. But incorporating trusted hosts is a
positive step toward achieving a distributed trusted
computing base.
Additionally, the design objectives used in the SCOMP
operating system, may be directly extended to the multilevel
secure network. For example, SCOMP ' s hardware reinforced
access control mechanism provides higher performance than one
implemented strictly in software. This technique may be used
to achieve efficient and reliable mediation between network
hosts
.
One ambitious Navy implementation attests to SCOMP 's
wide range of potential network applications. The Navy is
using a SCOMP design to allow two networks operating at
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different security levels to communicate with each other
[Ref. 9:p. 227].
3. Encryption
Encryption is one of the most important and widely
used security mechanisms in computing networks. Encryption
is the process of encoding individual letters or entire words
or phrases, in order to mask the true meaning of a message
[Ref. 3:p. 23]. Current encryption techniques generally
require three elements: One ingredient is the plaintext;
this is the message expressed in some natural language. The
second input is the encryption function or algorithm. The
third element is a unique key which is used in conjunction
with the encryption function, to produce the ciphertext
(encoded) message.
Encryption functions or algorithms range from simple
substitution (cipher) schemes to elaborate mathematically-
based transformations [Ref. l:pp. 59-125]. Frequently, the
encryption algorithm is a well-known public standard. Such
openness allows two mutually suspicious parties (i.e.,
processes of different network hosts) to communicate in a
cooperative manner. If both parties use the same encryption
function, each participant may place greater trust in the
integrity and authenticity of information received from the
other party.
In other cryptographic systems, the transformation
algorithm is secretly maintained within a cryptographic
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device. Although staunchly protected, if the device was to
fall into an intruder's hands, it would still be very
resistant to penetration.
Regardless of a public or protected encryption
algorithm, the key used in conventional ciphers is always
kept secret. Conventional cryptosystems use a single,
private key to both encrypt and decrypt the message. In this
way, only one encryption function must be employed and the
order of the encryption and decryption, makes no difference
[Ref. 10:p. 324].
In a conventional key system, if the system has n
users, then n*(n-l)/2 keys will be needed so each pair of
users may share a unique key [Ref. 3: p. 89]. Furthermore,
keys must be changed frequently, in order to maintain their
secrecy. Under such circumstances, the safe distribution of
so many keys can become extremely challenging.
Public key systems were designed to alleviate the
shortcomings of conventional key systems. Public key
cryptosystems employ two distinct keys per user; one is used
to encrypt the plaintext, while the other is used to decrypt
it. Since encryption and decryption are inverse functions,
it does not matter which operation is accomplished first.
To illustrate, suppose User A is assigned two keys.
One of these is openly published or distributed. The other
key is kept secret by A. Any user can send an encoded
message to A, by encrypting it with A's public key. The
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message will remain secret until A decrypts it using his own
private key. Moreover, if A wishes to send a secret message
to another user, say B, A may encrypt the message using his
own private key. Then, as long as B can identify that the
sender of the message was A, B can decrypt the message using
A's public key.
This scenario suggests a weakness in the public key
system. The recipient of the message may require some
assistance from the network in order to determine the
originator of an encrypted message and thus choose the
correct public key with which to decrypt it. Additionally,
the author of a message may disavow it at any time, .simply by
claiming that his private key had been compromised
[Ref. ll:p. 147].
Even in public key cryptosystems, key management can
be a major issue. Intricate numerical techniques are needed
to devise the pair-wise keys of public cryptosystems.
Additionally, users' private keys must be given the same
degree of protection as the data which they encrypt.
Further, key distribution is frequently a problem, since all
key changes must occur in unison. In other words, if a user
changes his private key, then all copies of the corresponding
public key must be changed simultaneously. There must be
some form of central authority that will maintain
responsibility for authenticating key changes and correctly
distributing public keys upon request [Ref. ll:p. 147].
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In computer networks, encryption may be applied to the
communications links between network hosts or across the
entire network, including all hosts. The first type of
encryption is called link encryption and is incorporated in
the OSI architecture at the second lowest (Data Link) layer.
Link encryption protects data during transmission
between network hosts. However, data that is inside the
host, remains in the clear. Link encryption is particularly
appealing in networks where hosts are relatively secure and
trustworthy. In this situation, link. encryption is a highly
efficient and effective means to protect data transmissions
on an insecure communications medium. The most significant
drawback of link encryption is that sensitive data remains
vulnerable to attack while it is inside unsecure network
hosts.
In contrast with link encryption, a second type of
encryption may be applied from "end-to-end", across the
network. End-to-end encryption (E3) may be implemented at
any OSI level, above the network layer.
E3 may be used to achieve a secure communications
channel between any two network processes. Messages remain
encrypted from source to destination, even within
intermediate hosts. Furthermore, E3 may be selectively
applied to secure the transmission path for an entire
communications session or for a single message exchange.
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Either link encryption, end-to-end encryption or both
may be offered on a single network. In any case, innumerable
encryption keys are needed to implement such methods.
The basic requirement to distribute and safeguard
large numbers of encryption keys has lead to the development
of automated key servers. The key server is a process that
issues keys as needed to network users [Ref. 3:p. 382]. Each
user registers a unique key with the key server. When two
parties wish to communicate, one of them requests a "session"
key from the key server. The key server generates a new
key and sends copies to both users. Each copy of the session
key is encrypted with the appropriate user's key that is on
file. Upon receipt of the encrypted session key, each user
decrypts it and uses it for secure communications. At the
end of this session, each user destroys the session key.
An automated key server offers a number of benefits
to secure networks. First, it can ensure the authenticity of
communicating parties. Additionally, it can maintain an up-
to-date registrar of network users. And finally, it can
efficiently support end-to-end encryption.
In summary, software protection mechanisms promote
efficiency and flexibility in the design of multilevel secure
networks. Access control mechanisms ensure each subject
possesses only those privileges necessary to complete the
task. IBM's Virtual Machine enforces the separation between
users and their operating systems, thus adding a second layer
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of security to the system. A security kernel implementation
provides a mechanism that ensures complete mediation, yet is
sufficiently simple and small to be completely verified.
Encryption protects data during transmissions and helps
ensure only authorized processes are allowed to communicate.
D. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY MECHANISMS
The design of a multilevel secure network begins with a
precisely defined security policy. From this policy
definition, a list of network security services must be
compiled. Then, in order to provide these security services,
protocols are developed to regulate the communications
between network processes, in accordance with the specific
security policy. Finally, protection mechanisms are selected
and developed to support the network security requirements.
Security mechanisms perform three basis functions: First,
they enforce the rules of procedure as set forth by security
protocols; second, these mechanisms actually implement the
security services; and third, they precisely execute the
security policy.
The preceding discussion surveyed a variety of hardware
and software mechanisms which can be used to support network
security. Just which protection mechanisms will be
incorporated in the network requires a number of important
design considerations. A systems architect must not only
consider the function and strength of the protection
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mechanism, but also its effect upon the system's performance.
He must seek to achieve a particular level of security, but
still incur only a minimal cost in processing overhead. The
performance resulting from the implementation of a particular
security mechanism should compare favorably with network
performance without that mechanism.
In general, hardware mechanisms provide higher
security/performance-cost ratios than do software mechanisms.
This is one of the main reasons for the recent trend in
computer network designs--to incorporate separate or front-
end processors which are dedicated to performing only
security- related functions.
It is inconceivable however, to implement in hardware, all
the support mechanisms necessary for adequate network
security. Software mechanisms offer characteristics of
flexibility and evolvability that are not available in
hardware. Software mechanisms facilitate the layering of
access rights, and are critical to providing multilevel
security on computer networks.
The selection of protection mechanisms must also depend
upon the network security policy to be enforced. The
TCSEC/TNI outlines the security policy for each class of
certification. For example, at the Bl level, both mandatory
and discretionary access controls must be enforced on the
network [Ref. 12]. The Bell-LaPadula model must be
implemented as the basis for all access controls, while
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additional user-controls must be used for discretionary
access permissions. (The Bell-LaPadula model is a formal
description of authorized information flows in order to
maintain data secrecy in a multilevel environment.)
Additionally, accurate security levels and labels must be
provided for all controlled subjects and objects. Despite
these requirements, the TCSEC/TNI do not specify the security
mechanisms needed to support them. Trusted computer and
network security criteria can only be achieved through
implementation of appropriate hardware and software
protection mechanisms. Such details of the network security
policy remain the joint responsibility of the sponsoring
customer agency and the systems designer.
Similarly, protocol specifications do not include the
mechanisms needed to support them. Security protocols
describe the access rules and exchange conventions necessary
to comply with the network security policy. They frequently
define strict requirements for data structures and
formatting. However, well-designed protocols are free of any
implementation details. They specify the process necessary
to complete a task, but not the mechanism by which it is
accomplished.
For these reasons, appropriate protection mechanisms are
significant design concerns for the system's architect.
Hardware and software protection mechanisms are essential
elements of secure computer networks. They are the
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instruments through which a definite security policy is
executed; the vehicles necessary for secure information flow.
While protocols govern the behavior of the computer process,




In this thesis, we noted a rapidly expanding demand for
secure network communications. We observed numerous complex
issues associated with network security, many of which can be
effectively resolved through the use of secure communications
protocols.
Security requirements for various network environments are
well defined. However, few efforts have been truly
successful in achieving verifiable designs for multilevel
secure networks. In order to encourage more widespread
development of multilevel secure networks, security protocols
must be carefully designed and standardized. Such standards
will foster substantial investments in compatible, yet secure
designs for network communications.
Three principles were proposed which we believe will
enhance the quality of standard security protocol designs.
These include the Compatibility Principle, the Inclusion
Principle and the Support Principle. Each of these
principles offers a significant improvement to proprietary
protocol designs.
The Compatibility Principle contends that security
protocols must be designed within the layered architecture of
the OSI reference model. Compatible security protocols offer
several benefits. Secure protocol designs may be able to
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utilize protocol functions and services already established
within a particular OSI layer. This techniques would achieve
the desire protection, while maintaining efficient operations
across the network. Further, using existing protocol
services could simplify the security protocol design, and
thus facilitate the verification process. Security protocols
which are compatible with conventional protocols would enjoy
the additional benefits of modularity and evolvability.
The Inclusion Principle specifically addresses multilevel
security concerns. This principle requires a separate suite
of security protocols for each sensitivity level processed.
The model prescribed by the Inclusion Principle vertically
partitions the horizontal protocol layers, into compartments
of different sensitivity levels. Essentially, the Inclusion
Principle describes what should already be intuitively
obvious--the higher the sensitivity level of information,"the
greater the protection needed to secure that information.
An advantage of the Inclusion Principle is that security
protocols may be designed to provide the functionality and
assurance appropriate to the level of information being
processed. Thus, the cost of protection would compare
favorably with the degree of security rendered. An
additional benefit of information integrity is realized from
separate security protocols for each sensitivity level,
because processes communicating across a multilevel secure
network will share equivalent security levels.
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The Support Principle maintains that security protocols
alone, cannot provide adequate network security. Appropriate
hardware and software mechanisms must be provided to support
the communications exchange and access controls, as specified
by security protocols.
Hardware mechanisms are needed to protect primary and
virtual memories as well as the state of the CPU during
process execution. Software mechanisms augment the security
provided by network hardware. Access control mechanisms
enable network hosts to identify the current privileges of
all executing processes, and encryption may be used to secure
the communications path between network processes. .Together,
hardware and software mechanisms may be used to effectively
isolate security functions from the possible misuse or
infiltration by other network system or user processes.
Thus, both hardware and software protection mechanisms are
needed to provide adequate network security. They must
enforce the rules of security protocols and implement network
security services.
If we are ever going to bridge the gap between security
and other aspects of network technology, we must adopt
standard security protocols. Collectively, these design
principles offer significant implications for such standards.
In order to provide truly secure and reliable multilevel
network communications, standard security protocols should
incorporate the following design attributes: They should be
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compatible with conventional protocols; they should include
the capability to simultaneously protect multiple sensitivity
levels; they should be properly supported by system's
hardware and software protection mechanisms.
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